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Consumer and Employment Arbitration Law in
Comparative Perspective: The Importance

of the Civil Jury
STEPHEN J. WARE*

Courts in the United States routinely enforce consumers' and
employees' pre-dispute agreements to arbitrate.1 Jean Sternlight is a
leading opponent of such contract enforcement. 2 Among her many
arguments for allowing consumers and employees to breach such contracts, she notes that this is precisely what courts outside the United
States do.3 Outside the United States, judicial enforcement of consumer
and employment arbitration agreements is, Professor Sternlight tells us,
rare to non-existent. She cites, in particular, the laws of the European
Union and its member nations,4 as well as a few non-European nations,

such as Brazil.5
So the United States is out of the mainstream with respect to arbi-

tration law. What, if anything, should be done about it? Jean Sternlight
favors harmonizing U.S. arbitration law with that of the rest of the
world, i.e., changing U.S. law so that pre-dispute consumer and employment arbitration agreements are no longer enforceable. 6
It is important to distinguish between this harmonization argument
and Jean Sternlight's other arguments for changing U.S. arbitration law.
* Professor of Law, Samford University, Cumberland School of Law. Thanks to Chris
Drahozal, Jean Stemlight, and Leigh Weaver.
1. See, e.g., Circuit City Stores v. Adams, 632 U.S. 105 (2001); Green Tree Fin. Corp.Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79 (2000); Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265
(1995); Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991). See generally STEPHEN J.
WARE, ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION §§ 2.9-2.14 (2001) (collecting cases on Federal
Arbitration Act (FAA) preemption of state law impeding contract enforcement).
2. See, e.g., Jean R. Stemlight, Is the U.S. Out on a Limb? Comparing the U.S. Approach to
Mandatory Consumer and Employment Arbitration to that of the Rest of the World, 56 U. MIAMI
L. REV. 831 (2002) [hereinafter Sterulight, Is the U.S. Out on a Limb?]; Jean R. Stemlight,
Mandatory Binding Arbitration and the Demise of the Seventh Amendment Right to a Jury Trial,
16 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 669 (2001); Jean R. Stemlight, As Mandatory Arbitration Meets
the Class Action, Will the Class Action Survive?, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1 (2000); Jean R.
Sterlight, Rethinking the Constitutionality of the Supreme Court's Preference for Binding
Arbitration, 72 TUL. L. REV. 1 (1997); Jean R. Sternlight, Panacea or Corporate Tool?:
Debunking the Supreme Court's Preference for Binding Arbitration, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 637, 676
(1996).
3. Sternlight, Is the U.S. Out on a Limb?, supra note 2, at 843-57.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 851 n.125.
6. Id. at 861-64.
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This short article addresses only the former. Professor Sternlight's other

arguments for changing U.S. arbitration law,7 and my arguments against
doing so, 8 are published elsewhere and do not need repeating here.9 So,
to reiterate, the following pages address only the harmonization argument for changing U.S. arbitration law.
The first thing to say about harmonization, i.e., uniformity of law
across jurisdictions, is that it is not an unalloyed good. There is a case
against uniformity, as well as a case for uniformity. In this article, I take
no position on whether the case for or against uniformity is stronger. I
seek only to briefly summarize the case for each side in the following
two paragraphs.
The case against uniformity celebrates diversity. On this view, it is

a good thing that different places have different laws. This, of course, is
7. See, e.g., supra articles cited in note 2.
8. See, e.g., Stephen J. Ware, Arbitration Under Assault: Trial Lawyers Lead the Charge,
(Apr. 18, 2002), available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa-433es.html; Stephen J. Ware,
Paying the Price of Process: Judicial Regulation of Consumer Arbitration Agreements, 2001 J.
Disp. RESOL. 89; Stephen J. Ware, The Effects of Gilmer: Empirical and Other Approaches to the
Study of Employment Arbitration, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 735 (2001); Stephen J. Ware,
Consumer Arbitration as Exceptional Consumer Law, 29 McGEORGE L. REV. 195 (1998);
Stephen J. Ware, Arbitration and Unconscionability After Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 31
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1001 (1996); Stephen J. Ware, Employment Arbitration and Voluntary
Consent, 25 HOFSTRA L. REV. 83 (1996).
9. I cannot resist, however, responding to one point in Jean Sternlight's contribution to this
symposium. She refers to arbitration "imposed through contracts of adhesion" as "mandatory"
because she "can not understand how a person can be said to have 'voluntarily' accepted
arbitration when it is part of a small print contract of adhesion." Sternlight, Is the U.S. Out on a
Limb?, supra note 2, at 831 n. 1.
The terms of adhesion contracts are voluntary, rather than mandatory, because a person is not
bound by such terms unless that person has manifested assent to them, and manifestation of assent
is (except in cases of duress) a voluntary act. A consumer who signs or otherwise manifests
assent to a standardized document is manifesting assent, not merely to the terms the consumer has
read or understood, but "to the terms not read or not understood, subject to such limitations as the
law may impose." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) of Contracts § 211 cmt. b (1981). For elaboration of
these points with respect to arbitration, see Ware, Consumer Arbitration as Exceptional Consumer
Law, supra note 8, at 200-05; Ware, Employment Arbitration and Voluntary Consent, supra note
8, at 113-26.
Like trial-lawyer organizations lobbying against enforcement of pre-dispute arbitration
agreements, see for example, John Vail, Defeating Mandatory Arbitration Clauses, TRIAL, Jan.
2000, at 70-71; F. PAUL BLAND JR. ET AL., CONSUMER ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS (2001),
available at http://www.tlpj.org/caa.htm. Jean Stemlight uses the terms "mandatory" and
"voluntary" arbitration as shorthand for arbitration arising out of pre-dispute and post-dispute
agreements. This usage should be avoided for the reasons stated in the leading arbitration treatise:
This term ["mandatory"] is sometimes used to describe arbitration resulting from
agreements to arbitrate future disputes, since once an enforceable agreement has
been made, arbitration is "mandatory." This is extremely confusing language
because it ignores altogether the consensual element in contracts. . . . [I]ts usage
resolves linguistically the issues of the reality of consent and the effect to be given
to consent by fiat, rather than by analysis revealing the nature of the issues.
IAN R. MACNEIL ET AL., FEDERAL ARBITRATION LAW § 2.5, at 2:36 n.5 (1994).
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the case for federalism within the United States, and calls to mind Justice Brandeis's famous view of states as laboratories of democracy. "It
is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous state may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try
novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the
country."' 0 This case for diversity and experimentation applies among
nations, as well as among states.
On the other hand, there is also a case for uniformity. The standard
view among "comparativists and law reformers," as Steven Walt puts it,
is that
uniform rules promote efficiency. Diverse national laws create legal
costs of determining and complying with the laws of multiple jurisdictions. Ex post litigation costs of forum shopping and deciding
sometimes difficult choice of law issues are also produced. Because
uniform law subjects a transnational commercial transaction to a single set of rules, it reduces the legal costs associated with the

transaction."
So nations receive a benefit when they harmonize their laws.' 2 An individual nation pays a price when it stands outside the mainstream, refusing to harmonize. Is the United States paying such a price with respect
to arbitration law?
If so, I suggest that this price is far lower than the price the United
States pays by standing outside the mainstream on a far more important
area of law, the civil jury. The United States is the only major nation to
make extensive use of jury trials in civil cases. 3 When comparative law
books survey adjudication around the world, the aberrant presence of the
civil jury in the United States (and formerly in England) receives significant discussion, while the unique arbitration law of the United States
receives no mention at all. 4 This is undoubtedly explained in part by
10. New State Ice Co. v. Liebman, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting.)

11. Steven Walt, Novelty and the Risks of Uniform Sales Law, 39 VA. J.

INT'L

L. 671, 671-72

(1999).
12. Again, this short article takes no position on whether the case for or against uniformity is
stronger generally, or stronger with respect to arbitration law. Whether the benefit of
harmonization (uniformity) outweighs the cost is the subject of much debate and likely varies
from one context to another. Thoughtful treatments of the pros and cons of uniformity are found
in Larry E. Ribstein & Bruce H. Kobayashi, An Economic Analysis of Uniform State Laws, 25 J.
LEGAL STUD. 131, 138-41 (1996), and Paul B. Stephan, The Futility of Unification and
Harmonization in International Commercial Law, 39 VA. J. INT'L L. 743 (1999).
13. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CHALLENGE AND REFORM 193-94
n.l (1996) (referring to the abolition of the civil jury as "a course that the rest of the civilized
world took long ago"); KONRAD ZWEIGERT & HEIN KoXrz, AN INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE
LAW 267 (1977); Christopher R. Drahozal & Raymond J. Friel, Consumer Arbitration in the EU
and the US, 28 N.C. J. INT'L L. & CoM. REG. (forthcoming 2002).
14. See, e.g., MARY ANN GLENDON ET AL., COMPARATIVE LEGAL TRADITIONS 167 (2d ed.
1994); JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN ET AL., THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION 1013-26 (1994).
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the fact that the United States has been outside the mainstream on civil
juries far longer than it has been outside the mainstream on arbitration."
But it is also explained by the fact that extensive use of the civil jury is a
far more important anomaly than enforcement of consumer and employment arbitration agreements.
The civil jury impacts nearly every aspect of civil litigation in the
United States. 16 To give just three examples, the civil jury bears a large
share of responsibility for: (1) the cost and intrusiveness of U.S. discovery; (2) the theatrics of U.S. trials; and (3) the complexity of U.S. evidence law. These three peculiarities of U.S. civil litigation are discussed
in turn.
1. The Cost and Intrusiveness of U.S. Discovery
There are undoubtedly many legal, historical, and even cultural reasons why discovery in the United States grew to be especially costly and
intrusive. The civil jury, however, can be singled out as an obstacle to
discovery reform.
In the civil law nations, where there is no tradition of civil trial
by jury.... [t]here is no such thing as a trial in our sense; there is no
single concentrated event. The typical civil proceeding in a civil law
country is actually a series of isolated meetings of and written communications between counsel and the judge, in which evidence is
introduced, testimony is given, procedural motions and rulings are
made, and so on. Matters of the sort that would ordinarily be concentrated into a single event in a common law jurisdiction will be spread
over a large number of discrete appearances and written acts before
the judge who is taking the evidence. Comparative lawyers, in
remarking on this phenomenon, speak of the "concentration" of the
trial in common law countries and the lack of such concentration in
civil law countries. 17
The concentrated trial in the United States contributes to the scope
of U.S. discovery. As John Langbein puts it,
Part of what makes our discovery system so complex is that, on
15. Cases enforcing pre-dispute consumer and employment arbitration agreements did not
become common until the 1990s, although there were a few such cases from the 1970s and 1980s.
See, e.g., Ware, Employment Arbitration and Voluntary Consent, supra note 8, at 95-100. By
contrast, the United States has probably always been outside the mainstream regarding civil juries
and certainly has been outside the mainstream since England largely abolished civil jury trial in
1933. See Administration of Justice (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1933, 23 & 24 Geo. 5, c. 49,

§ 6 (Eng.).
16. GLENDON ET AL., supra note 14, at 167 ("Many of the differences between the [civil law]
model and the usual American trial seems attributable to the absence of the civil jury in civil law
countries.").
17. MERRYMAN ET AL., supra note 14, at 1014.
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account of our division into pretrial and trial, we have to discover for
the entire case. We investigate everything that could possibly come
up at trial, because once we enter the trial phase we can seldom go
back and search for further evidence. By contrast, the episodic character of German fact-gathering largely eliminates the danger of surprise; if the case takes an unexpected turn, the disadvantaged litigant
can count on developing his response in another hearing at a later
time. Because there is no pretrial discovery phase, fact-gathering
occurs only once; and because the court establishes the sequence of
fact-gathering according to criteria of relevance, unnecessary investigation is minimized.' 8
What stops the United States from abandoning its concentrated trial and
the sharp division between the pretrial and trial stages of litigation? The
answer is the civil jury, which makes a discontinuous trial impractical. 19
Paul Carrington points out that:
In a system not bound to conduct trials to suit the convenience of
jurors, it would be easier to design a mechanism for gathering evidence that would be more efficient than the one we know, for discovery could then be limited to information for which there is a specific
and immediate need in the ongoing but discontinuous trial.2 °
2.

The Theatrics of U.S. Trials

The civil jury is also responsible for the theatrics of U.S. trials.
Paul Carrington describes this very well:
The jury trial is, like radio, a "hot medium" that calls for strongly
evocative, rousing artistry, in contrast to the "cool medium," the nonjury trial, that, like television, calls for understated artistry. Consequently, there are often differences in styles and personal values of
jury lawyers and non-jury lawyers. Legal professions in other countries, lacking the civil jury system, seem seldom to produce persons
having the flamboyance of American jury lawyers. Perhaps this is
their misfortune, but for those who prefer greater dignity in the legal
system, it is an adverse consequence of2 the civil jury system that it
rewards the abilities of the demagogue. '
By contrast, consider the following description of a civil trial in a nation
which does not use civil juries: "German civil proceedings have the
18. John H. Langbein, The German Advantage in Civil Procedure, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 823,
831 (1985).
19. Historically, the concentrated trial "eliminated the problems of reassembling and
controlling groups of laymen across long intervals, problems that would otherwise have bedeviled

a system of routine but discontinuous jury trial." Id. at 863.
20. Paul D. Carrington, The Seventh Amendment: Some Bicentennial Reflections, 1990 U.
CHI. LEGAL F. 33, 40 (1990); see also RUDOLPH B. SCHLESINGER ET AL., COMPARATIVE LAW 446-

49 (6th ed. 1998).
21. Carrington, supra note 20, at 41.
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tone not of the theatre, but of a routine business meeting-serious rather
than tense. When the court inquires and directs, it sets no stage for
advocates to perform. The forensic skills of counsel can wrest no mate'22
rial advantage.
3.

The Complexity of U.S. Evidence Law

Finally, there is little doubt that the civil jury bears responsibility
for the complexity of U.S. evidence law. Evidence law grew as a means
of controlling juries, 23 and nations that have never used civil juries have
less complex evidence law.24
In sum, much of what makes civil litigation in the United States
materially different from civil litigation elsewhere in the world can plausibly be traced back to the jury. By contrast, enforcement of consumer
and employment arbitration agreements affects only a few categories of
cases and, within those categories, affects only those cases in which an
enforceable arbitration agreement has been formed. The civil jury is a
mountain; enforcement of consumer and employment arbitration agreements is a molehill. Those who value uniformity across nations and
seek to bring U.S. law into the international mainstream should be far
more troubled by the civil jury than by enforcement of consumer and
employment arbitration agreements.
Bringing the United States into the mainstream on the civil jury
might even bring it into the mainstream on arbitration. It may not be a
coincidence that the only nation with the civil jury is the only nation that
enforces consumer and employment arbitration agreements. Eliminating
the civil jury might eliminate the three aforementioned peculiarities of
U.S. litigation: costly and intrusive discovery, theatrical trials, and complex evidence law. While each of these peculiarities may please U.S.
lawyers, avoiding these peculiarities may be a common reason why
businesses flee U.S. courts for arbitration. After all, arbitration is generally thought to eliminate costly and intrusive discovery,2 5 theatrical trials, and complex evidence law.2 6 Perhaps eliminating these peculiarities
from U.S. litigation would substantially reduce the desire of businesses
to flee U.S. courts for arbitration.
I conclude then, with a question for Jean Sternlight and others who
22. Langbein, supra note 18, at 831.
23. ELLEN E. SWARD, THE DECLINE OF THE CIVIL JURY 82-84, 243-60 (2001).
24. See, e.g., MARY ANN GLENDON ET AL., COMPARATIVE LEGAL TRADITIONS 167 (2d ed.

1994) ("The factor of the civil jury also helps to explain the relatively great number of
exclusionary rules in the common law of evidence and the relatively few restrictions on
admissibility in the civil law systems.").
25. MACNEIL ET AL., supra note 9, § 34.1.
26. MACNEIL ET AL., supra note 9, §§ 35.1.2.1, 35.1.2.4.
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oppose enforcement of pre-dispute consumer and employment arbitration agreements. Are you willing to bring the United States into the
mainstream on both arbitration and on the civil jury? If so, then perhaps
a deal can be reached.

